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Abstract 
 
Purpose - This paper aims to set out several of the key issues and areas of the inter-disciplinary field of 
climate change research based in accounting and accountability, and to introduce the papers that 
compose this AAAJ special issue. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper provides an overview of issues in the science of climate, as 
well as an eclectic collection of independent and inter-disciplinary contributions to accounting for 
climate change. Through additional accounting analysis, and a shadow carbon account, it also illustrates 
how organisations and nations account for and communicate their Greenhouse Gas (GHG) footprints 
and emissions behaviour.   
Findings – The research shows that accounting for carbon and other GHG emissions is immensely 
challenging because of uncertainties in estimation methods. The research also shows the enormity of 
the challenge associated with reducing those emissions in the near future.  
Research limitations/implications – The research raises a series of implications for individuals, 
organisations, sectors and nations in coming to terms with ever increasing carbon and other GHG 
emissions. It raises questions about the adequacy of current policy formulations to curb such emissions. 
Originality/value – The paper surveys past work on a wide variety of perspectives associated with 
climate change science, politics, policy, as well as organisational and national emissions and accounting 
behaviour. It provides an overview of challenges in the area, and seeks to set an agenda for future 
research that remains interesting and different. 
Keywords  Climate Change Accounting, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Carbon Accounting, Sustainability, 
National GHG Inventory 
Paper type General review 
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1. Introduction 
When we put out the call for papers for this special issue back in 2008, things were certainly heating up. 
Literally in the case of the atmosphere, according to decades of scientific evidence (IPCC, 2007; 
Anderegg et al., 2010), but also in terms of public perceptions, fanned by a series of popular books (e.g., 
Lynas, 2004; Flannery, 2005; Monbiot, 2006; Pearce, 2006; Hamilton, 2007), and media attention.1 The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Al Gore and Nicholas Stern also ensured lively 
debate in the world’s political arenas (Gore, 2006; Stern, 2006; IPCC, 2007). Kevin Rudd had recently 
been to the Bali climate talks (Dec 2007) having signed Australia up to Kyoto, and there was building 
optimism that the 15th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (COP 15) in Copenhagen in late 2009 would finally see the world’s politicians take 
climate change seriously and hammer out a new and significant post Kyoto 2012 agreement. The 
optimism was further fuelled by Barak Obama’s election as US president in late 2008. As we know, that 
is history. Copenhagen came and went, and Cancun in December 2010 (COP 16) hardly made the news. 
Politically at least, things have cooled,  more pressing needs such as economic recessions, bank failures, 
and potential EU member state failures have taken precedence, and we appear to be no closer to a new 
binding international agreement.2        
 
Despite the fickle attention of politicians, however, the scientific evidence continues to amass. Although 
not all agree (see Morgan and McCrystal, 2009), 97-98% of the scientific community appears to accept 
the primary conclusions of the IPCC that it is “very likely” that “most” of the “unequivocal” warming of 
the Earth’s average temperature over the second half of the 20th century is due to anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Anderegg et al., 2010; see also Oreskes, 2004). Anderegg et al. 
reached this conclusion based on a review of 1372 climate researchers and their publication and citation 
records.  Agreement on this aspect of the debate, however, is only part of the issue. Other aspects 
concern the history of climate constructed from paleoclimate records (i.e., polar ice cores, ancient lake 
beds) and, more pertinently, future climate scenarios using climate modelling. For example, to what 
level should concentrations of atmospheric carbon dioxide levels be stabilised and by when? 350ppm? 
450ppm? 550ppm? By 2020? 2040? 2050? Much less scientific consensus exists in regard to these 
matters (Morgan and McCrystal, 2009); likewise with respect to the effects of melting ice caps, ocean 
circulation, tundra and deep sea methane releases, radiative forcings, clouds and water vapour, albedo 
feedbacks, and shorter term climatic variation such as El Nino and La Nina events.3  
 
Add to these scientific uncertainties the uncertainties of assessment and measurement methodologies, 
and the vested interests of oil, coal, industrial, agricultural, environmental and political lobbyists, and 
one is faced with a plethora of arguments about the adequacy or otherwise of domestic and 
international policies to promote reductions in human-induced  GHG emissions. Are alternatives needed 
and how drastic do they need to be? (See, for example, Meyer, 2000; Bodansky and Pew, 2004; Blok et 
al., 2005; Boston, 2007; Hamilton, 2007; Jordan and Lorenzi, 2007; Prins and Rayner, 2007; Anderson 
and Bows, 2008; Stern, 2010.) The problem has been described, aptly we suggest, as ‘wicked’ or ‘super-
wicked’ (Lazarus, 2008; Ludwig, 2001) and consequently without solution or perhaps in need of a 
‘clumsy’ one (Verweij et al., 2006). International policy proposals to avert ‘run away’ or ‘dangerous’ 
climate change include suggested targets for stabilising atmospheric GHG concentration. These include 
possible emission cuts of 80-90% by 2050 with significant cuts required immediately or very soon (e.g., 
Meyer, 2000; IPCC, 2007; Anderson et al., 2008; Agnolucci et al., 2008; Stern, 2008; 2010). Most 
countries are currently committed to only very modest reductions in GHG emissions under the Kyoto 
protocol.  
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In the following sections of this paper we firstly articulate the importance within social and 
environmental accounting research of inter-disciplinary perspectives. The next two sections then move 
on to illustrate the importance of keeping a wider preview on matters associated with climate change 
and emissions behaviour. With data from an organisation (Air New Zealand), examining aviation in New 
Zealand’s tourism sector, as well as New Zealand’s national GHG inventories, we illustrate the 
uncertainties, complexities and challenges involved in accounting for carbon dioxide and other GHGs. 
We also raise questions about the efficacy of offsetting and the possibilities for timely emission 
reduction. Our aim is to make clear that emissions come from individual as well as organisational 
activity, and we should not necessarily seek to reduce all climate change based accounting research to 
analyses of corporate carbon footprints and reporting, and if we do, there are interesting and different 
ways in which we might tackle those. Keeping with a theme of interesting and different, the penultimate 
section of our paper introduces eleven contributions to this special issue – seven of which appear in this 
volume and four of which continue in 2012. These papers provide an eclectic collection of viewpoints on 
climate change accounting research, with contributions from human geographers, political and policy 
scientists, organisational scholars, as well as accounting and auditing scholars. Finally, in the conclusion 
we return to our earlier examples to question the adequacy of existing climate change policy.   
 
   2. Interesting and Different 
Caught up in climate change debates are the inevitable clashes of discourse (Dryzek, 1997; Hajer, 1995; 
Herndl and Brown, 1996) through which we express understanding, differences, values, beliefs, desires 
and fears about climate change, the future and the adequacy or otherwise of policy attempts and other 
behaviours to address them. Emphasising differences in power/legitimacy, knowledge and emotions, 
Herndl and Brown (1996) offer a typology of environmental discourse that includes: (1) the 
regulatory/institutional, (2) the scientific/technical, and (3) the poetic/emotive. Likewise, Hannigan 
(2006) recognises the discourses of: (1) the poetic/romantic and (2) systems/science, and to these he 
adds (3) justice/rights.  We suggest all these elements of discourse are likely to inform our 
understanding of climate change based accounting research. Many of them come through a number of 
the papers included in this special issue. Other work, too, drawing on these discourses has sought to 
offer technical, accounting, and ethical critique of carbon trading (e.g., Lohmann, 2005, 2006, 2009a, 
2009b; Smith, 2007; Newell, 2008; Knox-Heyes, 2009a, 2009b), carbon offsetting (Bäckstrand and 
Lövbrand, 2006; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; Smith and Rodger, 2009), and emerging codes of conduct 
and voluntary standards (Lovell et al., 2009).  
 
The social and environmental and critical accounting research communities are known to embrace 
methodological pluralism and inter-disciplinary perspectives on accounting. By avoiding the trivial and 
the overly technical, and by drawing on a wide range of the social sciences to provide context to their 
work, scholars remain focused on socially relevant problems and issues to which accounting contributes 
or potentially could alleviate. A pertinent and early example for this issue concerns the papers on 
accounting for sulphur dioxide emissions.  While Wambsganss and Sanford (1996) offer a narrow 
technical accounting solution to the reporting of sulphur dioxide emissions permits, Milne (1996), 
Lehman (1996) and Gibson (1996) examine the issue in a wider inter-disciplinary context. Drawing on 
economics, ethics, political philosophy, law, health, and environmental studies, they more critically 
examine the wider social and environmental problem of acid rain, its regulation, the use of tradable 
emission permits, equity and justice when doing so, and broader concerns of human/nature 
relationships. Arguably it is work in this vein that O’Dwyer (2011) had in mind in his tribute to David 
Owen as marking out the tradition of social and environmental accounting research as “interesting and 
different.” It is certainly the type of approach we seek to reflect in this AAAJ special issue, and 
encourage in the future. For this reason, the first three papers in this issue were commissioned from 
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scholars in human geography, political and policy science, and organisational behaviour. Along with 
other colleagues in these fields, they contribute in various ways to our understanding of climate change 
policy, government, organisational and individual behaviour, as well as the implications of these for 
accounting and vice versa. We hope these papers stimulate readers to seek out further work from these 
relevant fields of study. 
 
While early research located within organisational studies noted active political resistance and climate 
change denial (e.g., Kolk and Levy, 2001; Levy and Egan, 2003; Livesey, 2002), businesses are now 
engaging in various programmes, with measures, targets and market trading (e.g., Kolk and Pinkse, 
2004, 2005;  Begg et al., 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Pinkse and Kolk, 2009), spawning business interest in 
strategy, opportunities and “how-to” guides (e.g., Harvard Business Review special issue, 2007; 
Hoffman, 2006, 2007; Hoffman and Woody, 2008). Similarly, there is increased interest in carbon 
accounting, GHG inventories (carbon footprinting), the GHG protocol, the assurance of GHG inventories, 
as well as carbon offsetting, with a number of organisations in recent years proclaiming gained 
efficiencies in their carbon management strategies, and/or their ‘carbon neutrality’ (e.g., WBCSD/WRI, 
2004; Hoffman, 2007; EM/NCF, 2008; Bebbington and Larrinaga-González, 2008; Kolk et al., 2008; 
IAASB, 2009; Simnett et al., 2009).  A number of the papers in this special issue continue research on 
these themes.  
 
On a more sobering note, much work remains to be done that tackles the actual dynamics of 
organisational emissions reduction programmes (Ball et al., 2009) and the key motives that drive or 
inhibit action (Okereke, 2007). Similarly, considerably more work is required that critically scrutinises the 
obvious tensions and paradoxical motives between organisational and national desires to reduce 
ecological impacts and desires to grow and succeed economically. Despite the growing tide of corporate 
activity on climate change no meaningful progress is being made on global GHG emissions reduction, 
and in some instances, no meaningful progress is being made on national Kyoto emission reduction 
targets, suggesting the continuation of relatively weak policy regimes and ‘business-as-usual’ (Jones and 
Levy, 2007). In the following section we examine GHG emissions in transport and more widely in New 
Zealand’s tourism sector. We then consider New Zealand’s national GHG emission reductions 
behaviours. We hope they raise questions, provoke thought and lead others to engage in further critical 
analysis of climate change issues.  
 
3. Scale, Eco-efficiency and the Un-sustainability of Climate Change: Can We Keep Driving and Flying 
(more)? 
 
In 2008, Time Magazine marked 100 years of the Model T Ford.4 In 1908, the Model T could do 11-18 
lit/100km, and 194,400 motor vehicles were registered in the US. By 2006, US registered vehicles 
numbered 135.4 million – a factor increase of 696, although it might be as high 1200.5 Modern vehicles 
can do about 4-6 lit/100km, but some do more, and the EU now obligates fuel efficiency for new 
vehicles to 130g/km on average by 2015 (equivalent to less than 5 lit/100km). At best, then, a factor 
increase in fuel efficiency of 6 has been utterly swamped 100-200 times by vehicle volumes. The effects 
of scale matter! While population growth accounts for some of the 600-1200 factor increase, it does not 
account for much. In 1908, the US population stood at 88.7 million. By 2010 it stood a little under 4 
times bigger at 308.7 million. The critical factor in rising numbers is the rising expectations, income and 
affluence of the population (Dargay et al., 2007; Hamilton and Denniss, 2005). In 1908, less than one 
fifth of 1% of people in the US owned a vehicle. By 2010, on average, 81% do (Dargay et al., 2007).  
 
So what of the next 100 years? Will population and increasing affluence continue to drive vehicle 
ownership faster than vehicle efficiencies and, thereby, increase global emissions of CO2? In some 
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countries almost certainly, but overall perhaps not, since vehicle ownership rates do reach saturation 
levels eventually. Dargay et al. (2007) estimate these for various countries at between 65% and 85%, 
and go on to project increases in vehicle ownership out to 2030. While the US is expected to add 80 
million vehicle owners over 30 years (+34%) and OECD countries 290 million (+47%), the non-OECD 
countries increase by a factor of 6, adding another 977 million to create a projected world total of 2080 
million by 2030 – a total factor increase of 2.5. Overall, factor increases in fuel efficiency over the next 
20 years may be able to keep pace with some growth rates, but bringing down global CO2 emissions 
from vehicles any time soon seems unlikely since both China and India are expected to add 500 million 
vehicle owners at factor rates closer to 20.6  
 
As with cars, so for planes. Airbus, the European aircraft manufacturer, forecasts global air passenger 
growth rates over the next 20 years (2010-2029) at 4.8% per annum, with greater growth expected in 
emerging economies (Airbus, 2010). To meet a tripling of capacity, it anticipates an additional 25,000 
aircraft between 2010 and 2029. Between 1970 and 2010 capacity grew by a factor of 9 – significant fuel 
shocks and economic recessions seem only to dent demand temporarily. While fuel burn efficiency and 
aircraft loading rates have improved (e.g., +37% gain over last 20 years in fuel burn and +50% in loading 
rates over the last 45 years), they have not kept up with capacity increases and nor are they anticipated 
to. Claims made by Airbus on their website  that over the last 40 years the aviation industry has cut fuel 
burn and CO2 emissions by 70% seem disingenuous – they have per flight, but increased volume (9 
times greater) simply outstrips it. Fuel burn efficiency improvements will continue (40% expected by 
2030 reducing fuel burn to less than 3lit/100km/passenger)7, but they will not keep pace with a tripling 
of capacity. The great white hope for aviation appears to be a switch to biofuels, but there are both 
technical difficulties, as well as (in)justice issues over land competition for food production that seem 
likely to prevent any quick fix.  
 
The aviation industry is under some pressure to establish its environmental credentials. A review of Air 
New Zealand’s website and recent annual reports (2007-2010), for example, reveal references to 
increases in efficiency through fleet upgrades, flight testing jatropha (biofuel), savings of carbon 
emissions through plane modifications, reductions in CO2 emissions per million available seat 
kilometres, the establishment of the Air New Zealand Environmental Trust, and a Carbon Offsets 
Programme - where passengers can elect to purchase flight offsets. Reflecting the global economic 
recession, the 2009 and 2010 annual reports say less about environmental impacts – indeed, the 2010 
report stresses a readiness to “return to growth”. In 2007 and 2008, however, during the recent height 
in attention about climate change, the organisation was keen to promote it was “travelling lighter” for a 
“greener future for New Zealand tourism”. But such proclamations appear conditional. For example, Air 
New Zealand (2007, p.2) states:  
 
Carbon emissions are an inevitable consequence of air transportation and will continue to remain so, 
despite technological advancements, for the foreseeable future. However, as a small, geographically 
isolated country, air transport is vital in providing economic links to international markets. 
 
As New Zealand’s national carrier, we are absolutely committed to playing our part in ensuring that our 
environmental impact is minimised. We must continue to bring tourists to New Zealand, and remain 
committed to managing the environmental impact we have in the process.    
 
Unpacking such claims is critically important (Milne et al., 2009; Gray, 2010), yet assessing the extent to 
which “environmental impact is minimised” on the basis of total carbon emissions is difficult. Absent 
from the reports is any clear and transparent account or statement of the organisation’s carbon 
footprint over time. The 2007 report does disclose a total footprint of around 3.6 million tonnes of CO2e 
(MtCO2e) in 2006, and that 92% of that was contributed by jet fuel. Further reference to total emissions 
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in other time periods is absent. Based on emissions charts (per passenger per km) and gleaning 
information from the reports we estimate the organisation has made efficiency gains of 10-15% 
between 1995 and 2010. But have these also been outstripped by capacity increases? Using fuel 
purchase disclosures over time and publicly available jet fuel emission factors (Mfe, 2008), we construct 
a shadow carbon footprint shown in Table 1.8   
 
Table 1: Air New Zealand Fuel Consumption, Carbon Footprint and Financial Indicators (1995-2009)9  
 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 …. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 % 
change 
Fuel (M barrel) 6.5 7.5 7.7 7.7 7.6 .… 8.1 8.3 8.4 9.0 8.1 24.6 
CO2e (Mt) 2.85 3.27 3.37 3.37 3.35 …. 3.55 3.64 3.68 3.94 3.55 24.6 
Passenger Revenue (NZ$ Billion) 2.91 3.10 3.49 3.81 3.73  
Profit b/f Tax (NZ$ Million) 212 148 290 359 78  
Net Profit (NZ$ Million) 180 96 221 218 21  
Carbon Cost based on NZ$100/t (NZ$ Million) 355 364 368 394 355  
Carbon Cost as a % of Passenger Revenue (@NZ$100/tonne) 12.2 11.7 10.5 10.3 9.5  
 
The simple percentage growth (1995-2009) of 24.6% for fuel burn and CO2e exceeds the 10-15% 
efficiency gains, and illustrates an increasing impact on the atmosphere. This rate of growth is consistent 
with other New Zealand organisations (Milne, 2007) and overall CO2e emissions growth in New Zealand 
since 1990 of 20% or more (see next section). In 2008, Air New Zealand’s carbon footprint approached a 
new high of 3.94MtCo2e – the reduction in 2009 (and most likely in 2010) we believe is temporary and 
reflects economic recession impacts on demand, not recent technological improvements or the start of 
a declining trend. On the contrary, we anticipate a return to 2008 levels and higher.  
 
Should Air New Zealand have to face the full cost of a carbon tax on jet fuel or purchase carbon credits 
on its entire emissions, they could be significant.10 At a carbon price of NZ$20-100/tonne, and an annual 
cost of NZ$70-NZ$400m, the financial viability of the organisation would be in doubt. Depending on 
price, such costs could eliminate its entire annual profits should it have to absorb them. Of course, it is 
passengers that will face these costs, and that seems potentially far less impactful. At NZ$100/tonne, 
Table 1 shows an impact on current passenger revenue levels at around 10%, although at current carbon 
prices (NZ$20/tonne) it would be closer to 2-3%.11 Whether a 10% penalty charge would dampen 
demand and curb growth in aviation emissions is debatable. Rising incomes and easy lines of credit, we 
suspect, will accommodate such costs. We are not hopeful that existing GHG emission regimes will rein 
in long-term demand for air travel soon. 
 
The prospect of physically offsetting aviation emissions by emissions reductions elsewhere through fuel 
switching or investment in substitute renewable energy projects, or by increasing levels of carbon 
sequestration from regenerating native forest projects or tree planting, also seems remote (Milne, 2007; 
Smith and Rodger, 2009). A critical aspect of Smith and Rodger’s (2009) analysis, so often overlooked in 
carbon offsetting, and especially in regard to tree planting and forest regeneration, is recognition of the 
importance of timing differences in emissions and sequestration. A long haul flight emits CO2e in hours, 
yet to offset those emissions in hours is both cost prohibitive and in most cases physically impossible. 
And while some individuals can afford to physically balance their carbon books each year, most could 
not and few likely do. What is more important, however, is that everybody cannot offset emissions 
(Milne, 2007; Smith and Rodger, 2009). Scaling up the matching of New Zealand’s total aviation 
emissions with offset options within New Zealand looks infeasible.  
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Based on 2005 tourist visitor numbers to New Zealand (approx 2.4 million), and estimating for return 
flights and applying a radiative forcings factor of 1.9 (Sausen et al., 2005), Smith and Rodger (2009) 
estimate annual gross emissions at 7.89MtCO2e. They observe with forecasts of 3.5 million visitors in 
2015 these can only grow (>12MtCO2e). To offset the 2005 emissions, they investigate inter alia energy 
efficient light bulb replacement (240million@$578/visitor), wind farms switching for thermal generation 
(4250 turbines @$4840/visitor), domestic transport reduction (-63%), and setting aside regenerating 
native forest (@3tCo2e/hectare/yr this requires 27,000 hectares – 10% of New Zealand’s land mass –
and a likely 30% increase in forestry and reduction of 50% in agricultural pasture). Their conclusion is 
stark: New Zealand cannot now adopt feasible mechanisms to offset these emissions in New Zealand. It 
seems the only solution apart from actually reducing the emissions is to export the problem elsewhere, 
but can we keep doing that? And can everybody keep doing that? To get some idea of the problem at 
yet another scale, we now turn to New Zealand’s National GHG accounts. 
 
4. National GHG Accounting12  
Depending upon the country concerned, and the composition of its national GHG inventory or profile, a 
raft of interesting issues arise in terms of accounting, auditing and assurance. And in some cases such 
issues can really stretch the imagination in terms of conventional accounting and auditing technologies. 
New Zealand, with its unusual combination of agriculture, tourism, forestry and low but sparsely 
populated regions, provides an interesting case illustration. Nearly half of New Zealand’s GHG emissions 
come from agriculture, and substantial forests are considered available to offset emissions. As with 
many Kyoto signatories, New Zealand is committed and potentially liable for GHG emissions during the 
first commitment period (referred to as CP1) 2008-2012. In New Zealand’s case it is committed to 
holding its annual total net emissions during this period to 1990 levels – in other words a zero net 
increase. In anticipation of settlement in 2015, and for some years now, the Government has been 
estimating the potential liability or asset and carrying the provision in its National Accounts. To do this it 
needs to determine estimates of carbon prices, currency exchange rates, and the quantum of physical 
emissions and potential sequestration from Kyoto compliant sinks like forestry plantations. Table 2 
shows the summary results of these estimates in recent periods.  
 
Table 2: Projections of New Zealand’s Kyoto Liability (Asset) for five-year period 2008-2012  
Financial 
Statements 
Quantum 
Deficit/(Surplus) 
Carbon 
Price 
NZ$ Exchange 
Rate 
Carbon Price 
($NZ) 
Net Liability/(Asset) 
(NZ$ mill) 
June 2005 36.2 MtCO2e US$ 6.00 0.7010 8.56 310 
Dec 2005 64.0 MtCO2e US$ 6.00 0.6837 8.78 562 
June 2006 41.2 MtCO2e US$ 9.65 0.6063 15.92 656 
Dec 2006 41.2 MtCO2e US$ 9.65 0.7056 13.68 563 
June 2007 45.5 MtCO2e US$ 11.90 0.7689 15.48 704 
Dec 2007 45.5 MtCO2e € 11.13 0.5263 21.15 962 
June 2008 21.7 MtCO2e € 12.50 0.4829 25.89 562 
Dec 2008 21.7 MtCO2e € 10.00 0.4089 24.46 531 
June 2009 (9.6) MtCO2e € 10.00 0.4628 21.61 (207) 
Dec 2009 (9.6) MtCO2e € 10.75 0.5054 21.27 (194) 
June 2010 (11.4) MtCO2e € 10.75 0.5677 18.94 (212) 
Dec 2010 (11.4) MtCO2e € 10.75 0.5801 18.53 (207) 
May 2011 (21.9) MtCO2e € 10.95 0.5737 19.09 (417) 
Source: http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/greenhouse-gas-emissions/net-position/history.html 
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As Table 2 shows, the potential liability estimate (or asset/surplus – since if the net emissions are lower 
than Kyoto determined, the Government could sell its surplus emission units) has been highly variable 
over the years, and this has provided much ammunition for political sniping. When the estimated deficit 
grew to NZ$562m then to NZ$962m then back to NZ$562m and then to a surplus of NZ$207m, many 
were understandably confused, especially since the estimates refer to the same emissions period 2008-
2012. “Ropy accounting” was how Federated Farmers termed it.13 The current Minister of Climate 
Change Issues, Nick Smith, was more sanguine noting the difficulties involved: “The big changes have 
been in forestry and agriculture …. These significant variations in agricultural and forest data are a 
cautionary message about the uncertainty and challenges of carbon accounting in respect of natural 
systems.”14  
 
So what’s going on? Why are estimates of New Zealand’s Kyoto GHG emissions liability/asset so variable 
and what is the difficulty with forestry and agriculture? The simple answer lies in the fact that all 
forecasting is difficult, and the further into the future one forecasts the less accurate it is. Table 2, 
however, indicates that the big swings in the liability provision are not primarily the result of large 
swings in the price of carbon or the exchange rate, but rather to do with large fluctuations in the net 
physical quantum of emissions. Prices and exchange rates are current at the time of the estimates and 
not projections of those that will reign in 2015 when settlement day comes. The quantum of emissions 
over and above (or below) New Zealand’s 1990 emission levels, however, are projections of what will 
happen between 2008 and 2012 or, as time elapses, estimates of what did happen between 2008 and 
2012.15 The movement of estimates of the total physical quantum of net emissions is shown in Figure 1. 
These have moved from Kyoto surpluses of 35, 55, and 33 MtCO2e (2002, 2003 and 2004 projections) to 
overshoots of 36, 64, 41 and 21 MtCO2e (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 projections) and most recently back to 
surpluses of 10, 11 and 22 MtCO2e (2009, 2010, 2011 projections).  
Figure 1: Estimates of New Zealand’s surplus/deficit net emissions for Kyoto CP1 2008-2012 
 
 
Source: http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/greenhouse-gas-emissions/net-position/history.html 
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New Zealand’s Ministry for the Environment (Mfe) has responsibility for estimating and projecting the 
balance of Kyoto Protocol units (net position) during CP1 and annually releases a net position report 
along with detailed appendices. To compile this report it draws on data from the Ministries for Economic 
Development, Environment, and Agriculture and Forestry. Table 3 provides a breakdown of the net 
position estimates and projections made over the recent past (since 2006) for the five-year period 2008-
2012. It provides reconciliation with the quantum data shown in Table 2 and Figure 1.  
Table 3: A History of New Zealand’s GHG Net Position Estimates for Kyoto CP1 2008-2012 (Mt C02e) 
 May 
2011 
May 
2010 
May 
2009 
May 
2008 
May 
2007 
May 
2006 
Assigned Amount Units (1990 level over 5 years) 309.6 309.6 309.6 309.6 309.5 307.6 
Projected Emissions       
Stationary Energy 91.1 96.6 93.0 92.4 92.8 91.3 
Transport 70.5 67.8 71.9 71.3 80.1 78.8 
Industrial Processes 22.0 20.6 20.7 22.0 22.2 22.9 
Total Energy and Industrial Processes 183.6 185.0 185.6 185.6 195.1 193.0 
Agriculture 170.1 177.6 184.0 198.5 203.1 198.8 
Waste 9.9 8.2 8.3 7.2 7.0 6.5 
Solvents 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Total Gross Emissions 363.7 370.9 378.2 391.5 405.4 398.5 
Projected Removals       
Removals from post 1989 planted forests 89.3 89.1 92.3 84.1 79.0 78.2 
Less emissions from deforestation  -6.6 -9.2 -7.3 -16.9 -41.0 -38.5 
Net Forest Removals 82.8 79.9 85.0 67.2 38.0 39.7 
Net Emissions (Gross Emissions less removals) 280.7 291.0 293.2 324.3 367.4 358.8 
Other Adjustments -7.0 -7.2 -6.8 -7.0 +12.5 +10.0 
Net Position (AAUs minus net emissions +/- adj) 21.9 11.4 9.6 -21.7 -45.5 -41.2 
Source: http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/greenhouse-gas-emissions/net-position/index.html 
 
It is in Table 3 that we begin to get an understanding of what is going on at a national level in terms of 
GHG emissions and forestry sinks, remembering that each column represents estimates for the same 
five year period 2008-2012. The Assigned Amount Units of 309.6 MtCO2e relate to five years of the 1990 
annual GHG gross emissions of 61.9 MtCO2e. From Table 3 we can see total gross emissions during CP1 
are currently projected to be 363.7 MtC02e, and revised down from the 2007 high projection of 
405.4MtC02e. The key variations in these projections are agriculture and transport, with most other 
emission source projections remaining fairly constant. The 2011 gross emission estimates equate to 
average annual gross emissions of 73 MtC02e over the period 2008 through 2012 (i.e. 20% above 1990 
levels of 61.9 MtCo2e), while the 2007 projection suggested average annual gross emissions of 81 
MtCO2e over the period 2008-2012 (i.e. 30% above 1990 levels). This downward revision of forecasts for 
CP1 reflects the fact that New Zealand’s annual GHG gross emissions have very recently started to trend 
downwards, and this can be seen in Table 4 by drawing from data in the annual GHG Inventory 
reports.16   
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Table 4: New Zealand’s Annual Gross GHG Emissions (MtCO2e) 2005-2009 and 1990 benchmark 
 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 199017 
Stationary Energy 17.7 19.6 17.9 19.7 19.5 14.8 
Transport 13.8 14.3 14.9 14.4 14.2 8.8 
Industrial Processes 4.3 4.3 4.6 4.2 4.3 3.4 
Agriculture 32.8 34.8 36.4 37.7 37.4 32.5 
Waste 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.4 
Total Gross Annual GHG Emissions 70.6 74.7 75.6 77.9 77.2 61.9 
Source: Compiled by authors 
New Zealand’s annual GHG emission history since 1990 has been rather poor, and in every year since 
1990 it has exceeded those levels. Indeed, until only very recently have year-on-year emissions growth 
been curtailed. The high point in 2006 being 16 MtCO2e (26%) greater than 1990 levels. The 2009 gross 
emission levels currently exceed 1990 levels by 11.5 MtCO2e (20%).18 In short, then, New Zealand’s 
annual gross emissions were exceeding its 1990 levels by over a quarter in 2006: they now do so by a 
fifth. So what explains the recent decline in gross emissions? Has the upward trend really ended? Will 
the decline continue? To understand that one needs to unpack the changes in Table 4.  
As can be seen, the biggest contributors to gross emissions are agriculture, stationary energy and 
transport, and declines in agriculture and transport, with stationary energy oscillating somewhat, are 
the primary changes. Agricultural emissions are primarily associated with methane and ruminant 
animals, and nitrous oxide and fertilisers. Transport is mostly CO2 and road-based. And stationary 
energy is primarily electricity generation and other forms of static energy combustion producing CO2. 
Agriculture – and hence methane and nitrous oxide emissions - account for approximately 50% of New 
Zealand’s GHG emissions. Not surprisingly, then, more of the variations in Table 4 are associated with 
external and natural factors than human-based policy directives or actions. The recent declines in 
agricultural emissions, for example, are traced to drought conditions, lower stock numbers and less 
fertiliser application. The decline in transport emissions is primarily traced to the global recession and 
recent higher fuel prices. Stationary energy emissions reduced in 2007 due to switching power 
generation from coal to gas, but they increased again in 2008 due to the drought and low lake levels 
necessitating less hydro generation and more coal-fired electricity generation.19 High lake levels in 2009 
reversed this. Overall, then, the recent and very modest reductions in gross emissions have more to do 
with the vagaries of the seasonal climate and global economic conditions than any significant changes in 
policy-induced behaviours.  And, indeed, examining a more detailed year by year breakdown of the 2011 
net position statement (see Mfe, 2011)reveals forecasts for 2010, 2011 and 2012 in which transport and 
stationary energy largely flat line, and agriculture rebounds and increases emissions to greater than 35 
MtCO2e p.a. 
Were it not for the fact that New Zealand gets to set against its gross emissions net removals from post 
1989 forestry plantings under the Kyoto agreement, it would be in some strife (a liability of greater than 
NZ$1 billion for CP1). Shown in Table 3 these net removals are currently (2011) projected at 82.8 
MtC02e, turning the overshoot from gross emissions into a positive surplus projection (less adjustments) 
of 21.9 MtC02e. Previous projections of net forestry removals were not nearly so optimistic at 
approximately 40 MtC02e, suggesting New Zealand could have faced a Kyoto overshoot of in excess of 
45 MtC02e even with forestry included. Clearly, from Table 3, the key to turning around such a liability 
has been (so far at least) the prevention of deforestation intentions.            
So why have the agricultural and forestry (and, to a lesser extent, transport) projections been so 
drastically revised? And can New Zealand really rely on forestry to save its bacon as the Minister for 
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Climate Change Issues suggests has occurred to date? As already noted, revisions are made in part to 
reflect changed facts (like the 2008 drought and lower stock number estimates), but they also change in 
part to reflect changes in (ac)counting methodologies and their assumptions.  In some cases, inventory 
data replaces projections of emissions. In other words, one set of estimates replaces another. In other 
cases, new scientific data improves estimates and recalculations are made; in yet others models are 
refined. Methodologies and assumptions have been revised by both the IPCC/Kyoto policy makers, as 
well as New Zealand’s responsible Ministries, and they will likely continue to do so into the future as 
knowledge evolves. Detailed appendices to the net position report running to over 50 pages testify to 
some of the complexities involved. And all GHG Inventory reports carry sections on, and estimates of, 
the levels of uncertainty involved.   
The forestry projections, for example, are the result of estimating: the area of post-1989 planted forests; 
rates of afforestation; rates of planned deforestation and related amounts of deemed emissions; forest 
growth rates; and soil carbon loss following afforestation. The resulting methodology and assumptions 
are too detailed to cover here, but the data is generated from such sources as forest owner surveys, 
sample plots and deforestation intention surveys. Net forest removals projections made in 2008 
compared to those made in 2009, for example, have largely changed due to revised estimates of forest 
growth rates from sample plots – the trees are growing faster due to plantings in more fertile soils and 
being pruned less often (or not at all) resulting in greater C02 removals. Estimates of intended 
deforestation have also been revised down.  
What is critical to understand, however, is that any given year’s forest projections are subject to a large 
range of uncertainty due to “gaps in information and scientific knowledge.” Indeed, the data shown in 
Tables 3 and 4 are point estimates, and in Table 3 are point estimates based on the ‘most likely’ scenario 
estimated at the time of the projection. So, the 2011 net forest removals estimate of 82.8 MtC02 for 
CP1 was considered ‘most likely’ at that time. At the same time, however, other scenarios could see it 
fall to 53.9 MtC02 (-35%) or go as high as 105.7 MtC02 (+28%). The implications of these scenarios on 
the 2011 projected surplus of NZ$417m (shown in Table 2) are quite profound. Recasting the estimates 
using the most optimistic and pessimistic scenarios from forestry suggests New Zealand’s Kyoto 
liability/surplus could lie in the range of NZ$851m surplus to NZ$137m liability – a NZ$1 billion variation.  
Future projections of forestry intentions, of course, are likely to be uncertain, but significant levels of 
complexity and uncertainty also exist with estimates of agricultural emissions: methane emissions for 
animals; nitrous oxide emissions from animal dung and urine; and from nitrogen fertiliser. To generate 
estimates, complex models combine small scale measurements of animal methane emissions with feed 
intake data in a pastoral supply response model (PSRM) and gross these up with animal age, population 
and productivity data. Estimates are also made of nitrous oxide emissions from urine patches, dung and 
fertilised pasture. Methane estimates can vary by +/- 15%, while nitrous oxide from urine estimates can 
vary +/- 50%. Uncertainty exists, then, both due to a lack of scientific understanding, and because 
activity levels (populations, productivity, feed conversion) respond to unpredictable changes in 
agricultural conditions (e.g., droughts). Overall levels of uncertainty in the GHG inventories are falling as 
methods improve (or at least agreement is reached on which ones to adopt). The reported levels of 
uncertainty for the 2006 GHG inventory of +/-21%, for example, has reduced to +/- 12% for the 2009 
GHG inventory.  
As time elapses, and New Zealand approaches the 2015 settlement date, more uncertainties will 
disappear. The future will become history, and projections will become firmed up as annual estimates in 
the GHG inventories are submitted and ultimately approved by Kyoto. Not all uncertainty will disappear, 
however. Even at settlement date New Zealand will not have measured its GHG emissions during the 
first commitment period, but rather produced acceptable estimates – estimates acceptable because 
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they have, or at least the methods used to derive them have, been subject to review and audit and 
agreed upon. GHG emission accounting, like much other accounting, is set to remain part science, part 
modelling, part guess work and part negotiation.  
What is clear from this analysis is just how complex and uncertain the estimates are that underpin the 
single line liability provision for Kyoto in the National Accounts. Indeed, more staggering is the enormity 
and sophistication of the information systems that underpin the estimation of the physical quantum of 
net emissions in any given year. Just how robust the data and assumptions are that inform these 
systems is surely worthy of further research. Similarly, the means by which estimation models are 
adopted, adapted and audited needs further scrutiny. The interplay between the national inventory 
teams and the IPCC/Kyoto overseers also seems research worthy. Clearly national inventory teams have 
a vested interest in introducing new estimation techniques and revisions and recalculations that reduce 
GHG estimates, so how is this process managed? We have hardly touched the surface, but we note the 
annual New Zealand GHG inventory reports now run to over 400 pages providing a rich source of data 
on emissions as well as the processes involved.  
The preceding analysis at macro, meso, and organizational and individual levels illustrates the enormity 
of the challenge we face to decarbonise (and de-methanate) modern (industrial and agricultural) human 
activity. It also illustrates the challenges and difficulties involved in generating reliable and meaningful 
estimates of GHG emissions at various levels – especially in regard to methane and nitrous oxide, but 
also in regard to carbon sequestration by forestry.  Despite New Zealand introducing a domestic 
Emissions Trading Scheme, as other countries are doing, Ministry forecasts of gross emissions for 2010, 
2011 and 2012 are not much reduced compared to 2008 and 2009 years.  At best, one might argue such 
a scheme has prevented what might otherwise have been further increases in gross emissions of carbon 
dioxide – agriculture and methane are yet to enter the scheme – but it seems droughts and economic 
recession have likely done more. Whether the scheme represents the thin end of the wedge and a 
precursor to more serious policy initiatives remains to be seen. To date, New Zealand seems set to pin 
its hopes on forestry offsets with all the uncertainty that entails in both a Kyoto sense as well as in a 
physical (sequestration) sense. Forests, too, are susceptible to droughts and fire as well as foresters’ 
intentions.  
Substantial research opportunities exist to understand how GHG emissions are accounted for, audited, 
and how that comes to bear on emissions reductions policies and their effectiveness at all levels of 
analysis. Whether using readily available data, or that pieced together through careful analysis (i.e., 
shadow carbon accounting), we can see considerable opportunity to address the veracity of claims for 
reductions, offsetting and carbon neutrality at government, organizational and sector levels. Both within 
the compliance and the voluntary sectors, questions can be addressed, for example: to the scope of 
GHG covered; its accuracy and consistency of measurement over time; the type, calculation and timing 
of offsets; and the assurance of these processes. The GHG protocol emphasizes that organizations 
‘measure to manage’ their emissions. How successful are organizations at doing this? Why? Why not? 
And to what extent is a lack of reductions in total emissions obfuscated through claims to gains in 
efficiencies and/or offsetting strategies? Given the vagaries of some aspects of GHG accounting, it 
seems inevitable that political and vested lobby interests are likely to enter in the design, operation, and 
reporting and auditing phases of emission reduction schemes, both in respect to domestic and 
international regimes. How do these play out? Where are the points of tension and how are they 
resolved, and in who’s interests? In the next section, we introduce eleven papers that begin to provide 
some initial insights to some of these questions, but also which provide yet further stimulus for an 
ongoing research agenda into accounting for and assuring GHG emissions. 
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5. Further Interesting and Different Contributions to the Conversation 
Starting broad and moving to finer levels of analysis, our first three contributors reflect on wider 
conceptual issues concerning: what is carbon accounting? Why is the political and policy response to 
climate change so weak? What concerns different constituencies in accounting for carbon? Our next 
four contributions move to: an analysis of the voluntary corporate reporting of GHG emissions in 
Australia; a questioning of who’s interests are genuinely served by regulatory regimes that introduce 
market-based emissions trading schemes; an analysis of the performance of UK local authorities in 
regard to climate change performance indicators, and; insights into the private reporting relationships 
that exist within financial markets between institutional investors and their investments. Our last four 
contributions examine: the (lack of) role emissions disclosures play in financial markets; stakeholder 
submissions to promulgated emissions reductions policy in Australia; the prospect of an expectations 
gap between users, preparers and assurers of GHG emissions reports, and finally; the prospect that 
corporate disclosures on carbon emissions and other climate change related behaviours may serve 
purposes more symbolic (image) than substantive.  
Francisco Ascui and Heather Lovell (2011, pp.xx-xx) begin their paper on the premise that carbon 
accounting means different things to different people.  By acknowledging and highlighting conceptions 
of the meaning of carbon accounting by different communities of practice, the authors seek to 
illuminate tensions and contradictions as well as connections and overlaps relating to the term.  
Specifically, Ascui and Lovell (2011) make sense of fields occupied by scientists, politicians, economists, 
accountants and activists through use of the concept of framing as articulated in the social sciences.   
Accordingly, frames of reference considered by the authors include physical, political, market-enabling, 
financial and social/environmental modes of carbon accounting, respectively.  Ascui and Lovell (2011) 
contend that only by explicitly attending to the multiple framings can we begin to understand what 
underlies tensions associated with climate change and, then, in their terms, “encourage constructive 
learning and policy change” (p.x).  Vast opportunities for research exist as carbon accounting is 
contested, but is richly rewarding given the pertinence of addressing climate change and its appeal 
following on from the ongoing construction of frames by broad subsets of people. 
In a thought provoking policy piece, Jonathan Boston and Frieder Lempp (2011, pp.xx-xx) attend, firstly, 
to four systemic reasons why liberal democracies struggle when dealing with human-induced climate 
change and, secondly, assess critically possible solutions.  Reasons are provided in the form of 
asymmetries and the article includes an accounting asymmetry whereby financial statements value and 
account for manufactured and financial forms of capital and exclude natural capital and ecosystem 
services.  Reporting omissions at micro-level has implications on what does or, significantly, does not 
happen at macro- or national governmental-level.  The asymmetries provide insight into the difficulties 
of meeting the ambition contained in The Brundtland Report (1987) on meeting the needs of the present 
world without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).  Foregrounding the four politically-salient 
asymmetries is the spatial dimension of the climate change problem, that is, the disincentive for each 
nation state to contribute to what is effectively a global cause.  In response to the problems of reducing 
emissions, and following analysis of the literature, the authors present four categories of solutions and 
discuss how asymmetries may be ameliorated.  While acknowledging that human-induced climate 
change is a “super wicked problem” (Lazarus, 2009), Boston and Lempp hold that current political inertia 
given the seriousness of climate change is untenable.  If short-term economic interests prevail; the 
authors enunciate the outcome as a “tragedy of commons” (p.x). 
Frances Bowen and Bettina Wittneben (2011, pp.xx-xx) take a similar stance to Ascui and Lovell (2011) 
and Boston and Lempp (2011) in that they seek to provide an overview of the immense task of 
addressing climate change and confront what impedes efforts by seeking to understand the 
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perspectives of  key stakeholders.    In a novel approach, the authors make sense of discussions from a 
one-day workshop designed to elicit controversies, implicit assumptions and dominant discourses from 
representatives of three organisational fields.  Within- and across- field conversations were drawn at 
Oxford University from scientists; accounting professionals and academics; and, practitioners, 
researchers and critics of carbon governance systems.  Bowen and Wittneben (2011) show how the 
stakeholders in each of the fields prioritise one of the IPCC’s principles of accuracy, consistency and 
certainty outlined in the IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (2006) over the other 
and evaluate implications of this for developing carbon accounting systems.  The authors shed light on 
why carbon markets are not a widespread policy choice globally and observe that until “legitimate 
uncertainty over measurement” is reduced, other means of regulation are perhaps more effective and 
efficient in tackling climate change.  For nation states in which carbon markets are a reality, the authors 
call for negotiation between field participants in order to ensure actual reductions in greenhouse gases.   
In the Australian context, given an absence of a government mandate on disclosing GHGs at the time of 
research, Michaela Rankin, Carolyn Windsor and Dina Wahyuni (2011, pp.xx-xx) seek to explain 
individual corporate choice in reporting voluntary information to external stakeholders.  In a departure 
from previous research on social and environmental reporting, rather than use legitimacy theory as a 
theoretical lens, the authors utilise institutional governance systems theory (Griffiths et al., 2007, 
Griffiths and Zammuto, 2005), an emerging theory, to develop an understanding on GHG emissions 
disclosure.  Accordingly, the authors hypothesise that internal organisational systems and private 
regulation in the form of GRI guidance and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) influences the decision 
to report and, further, affects the extent and credibility of reporting.  The study employs a two-stage 
approach to address the two parts of the study.   In order to evaluate the extent and credibility of GHG 
disclosure, the authors have ‘tailored’ an index on greenhouse gases from the guidance presented in ISO 
14064-1.  Encouragingly, Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni (2011) find evidence of some companies 
embracing the challenge of adapting to a carbon constrained future and attribute pro-activeness to the 
need to address multiple risks and maintain an international as well as firm-specific advantage.  While 
the implementation of environmental management systems within an organisation and external NGO 
guidance provided by CDP are likely to assist progress to a low carbon economy, public policy issued by 
Australian federal and state governments is also required.    
Carolyn Windsor and Patty McNicholas (2011, pp.xx-xx) critically examine the idea of a market-
orientated solution by considering the Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) and, 
specifically, the financial regulatory structure that will oversee and monitor commoditised carbon 
financial products.  The authors point out that the same regulatory infrastructure failed to prevent the 
global financial crisis, question the efficacy of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970), and reveal 
that the global financial system’s regulation has not been addressed (Krugman, 2010). With the support 
of authoritative sources, including critical commentaries and established critiques of market 
environmentalism, the authors argue that a carbon market supported by carbon finance (a ‘financialised 
atmosphere’) is not the solution.  As strands within their argument, the authors critique an era of 
regulatory capitalism grounded in beliefs such as little government intervention and show that 
emissions trading confines accounting and accountability to the information needs of market 
participants rather than a broader array of stakeholders.  In short, what the government perceives as a 
market solution to global warming, Windsor and McNicholas (2011) persuasively argue is a ‘market 
problem’ to reducing climate change.  In contrast with the global financial crisis, if emissions trading fails 
to reduce GHGs, the authors contend that no amount of taxpayer funded bailout will avert catastrophe.  
The authors make a plea for leadership that engages with the wider community and initiates diverse 
approaches including the facilitation of known technological solutions.  More research is needed on the 
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value of non-market solutions in reducing GHG emissions in attempts to avert human-induced climate 
change. 
Stuart Cooper and Graham Pearce (2011, pp.xx-xx) consider action on climate change in the UK public 
sector in the form of a new performance framework for local authorities adopted in 2008.  In a move 
toward providing more discretion to local authorities and concomitant less national government 
steering, local authorities have the choice of prioritising up to 35 national indicators for inclusion in their 
Local Area Agreements (LAAs) (reflecting local ambitions) from a list of 198 indicators.  Following on, the 
authors’ present results from documentary analysis on the uptake of three indicators relating to 
progress on climate change (two on mitigating carbon dioxide emissions and one on adapting to climate 
change) by all local upper-tier and single local authorities in the UK.  This is supplemented with a set of 
in-depth interviews with officials engaged in negotiating LAA climate change indicators in local 
authorities located in the West Midlands.  Cooper and Pearce (2011) provide empirical evidence that all 
but a handful of local authorities working through Local Strategic Partnerships included at least one of 
the three national indicators on climate change as a priority.  Interview evidence gives insight into how 
climate change performance is measured and accounted for and reveals by-products of the 
performance process such as the build-up of climate change data and expertise.  As a postscript, Cooper 
and Pearce (2011) question the appropriateness of the Coalition Government’s Localism Agenda and, in 
particular, what this entails when the legal requirements of the Climate Change Act are considered.  The 
call for more research on sustainability (including climate change) accounting and accountability in the 
public sector, as put forward by Ball and Grubnic (2007), is arguably more relevant today given 
misgivings on market-based solutions. 
In direct contrast to research on public services, Jill Solomon, Aris Solomon, Simon Norton and Nathan 
Joseph (2011, pp.xx-xx) point to an absence of academic research on private climate change reporting 
between institutional investors and investee companies and so seek in their paper to initiate and 
provide momentum on research in this important area.  As the authors observe (p.x): 
The ways in which the institutional investment community embrace climate change issues in their 
investment strategy and decision-making is a crucial ingredient to the future success or failure of attempts 
to slow down global warming, as their impact on business through shareholder activism is substantial. 
 
Drawing on interviews with 20 institutional investors following one-on-one meetings with investee 
companies, the paper provides empirical evidence on the content, nature and process of private climate 
change reporting.  The vast majority of findings reveal that discourse is dominated by risk, risk 
management and crisis avoidance.  On this, Solomon et al. draw upon Beck’s (1992) thesis of a Risk 
Society and speculate that discourse is symptomatic of society becoming increasingly aware of, and pre-
occupied with, impending events.   Interestingly, the authors find that sustainability reporting discourse 
is not captured by corporations, as has been found in prior research on public sustainability reporting, 
but by the investor community.  While institutional investors are aware of material opportunities 
relating to climate change that investee companies can exploit, there was a notable absence of any 
ethical discourse in the one-to-one exchanges.  As a conclusion, Solomon et al. (2011) raise that failing 
to couch private climate change reporting in the language of social responsibility has implications for 
discharging broader accountability  beyond that of financial accountability. 
 
Continuing the investment theme of Solomon et al. (2011), Matthew Haigh and Matthew Shapiro (2012, 
forthcoming) recognise a potential divide between what companies report on greenhouse gas emissions 
and the interest taken by institutional investors in these disclosures.  In order to investigate whether 
carbon reporting matters to investors, the authors adopt the twinned perspective of signification and 
decision-usefulness, drawing upon the work of Barthes (1974) and Sharpe (1992) respectively.  Haigh 
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and Shapiro (2012) reason that just as politicians seek to convert voters through the power of the 
photograph, so too carbon reporters can facilitate the investment strategies of institutional investors.  
The paper establishes  a reasonable basis for carbon reporting from the extant literature on investors’ 
information requirements and then moves on to assess the interest of financial institutions based on 
interviews with finance professionals located in the main investment markets.  In summary, the authors 
note “a level of disengagement” by institutional investors in climate policy and claim unrealised 
potential from the presentation of carbon reports.   
The contributions by Sumit Lodhia and  Nigel Martin (2012, forthcoming) and Wendy Green and Qixin Li 
(2012, forthcoming) both take as a starting point the introduction of government policy on reporting of 
GHG emissions in Australia.  Lodhia and Martin (2012) analyse submissions by a range of stakeholders to 
government following consultation on the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (NGER) policy 
paper.  Deviating from more mainstream methods for analysing data reported in social and 
environmental accounting and auditing research, the authors execute their study through use of the 
Leximancer software package.  In short, this package combines the research techniques of concept 
mapping and analysis and content analysis.  Following the two-part analytical process, results from both 
the coarse and fine grained analyses of the stakeholder submissions are revealing.  For example, the 
authors find that in addition to reporting concerns by business constituents, environmental groups and 
associations raise issues relating to land clearing and deforestation.  Given the generation of concept 
statistics and maps, the Leximancer software seems useful for research yielding large volumes of 
stakeholder-related data.  More broadly, Lodhia and Martin (2012) affirm the usefulness of the agenda 
setting framework as a theoretical lens to understanding policy development and suggest more 
attention is needed on the inter-relationships between the different agendas as presented in the 
literature. 
In contrast to the policy formation focus of Lodhia and Martin (2012), Green and Li (2012) address the 
important area of assurance of greenhouse gas emissions.  In a paper that is thorough and 
comprehensive in coverage, the authors consider whether an expectation gap exists between emissions 
preparers, emissions assurers and shareholders with respect to the dimensions of responsibility, 
reliability, decision-usefulness and competency.  Given prior literature on prospective financial 
information audits suggests that the nature of the expectation gap can differ in settings involving 
increased uncertainty, the authors test for this by incorporating different types of emissions provided by 
the Greenhouse Gas Protocol.  Consequently, a different survey was developed for organisations with 
high levels of Scope 1 emissions (those arising directly from sources owned or controlled by the 
company), considered to face greater uncertainty, and for entities with high Scope 2 emissions (indirect 
emissions from purchased electricity).  Interestingly, amongst the results, the authors find assurers of 
the former type of organisation perceive themselves to be more responsible for the forecasts than did 
preparers and users.  In other words, there is evidence for a reversed expectation gap than that 
assumed in the literature.  Now that a price for carbon has been announced by the Australian Prime 
Minister, research opportunities on GHG assurance abound.  Green and Li (2012) suggest extending the 
study to consider other users of emissions data such as government policy makers and investment fund 
managers. 
The final paper by Sue Hrasky (2012, forthcoming) takes note of Hopwood’s (2009) observation that 
corporate environmental reporting may serve to protect the inner workings of an organisation from 
outside view and, in so doing, thicken the corporate veil (p.437).  In her study, Hrasky (2012) assesses 
whether footprint-related disclosures by Australian companies are more reflective of symbolism 
(pragmatic legitimation), the concern of Hopwood (2009), or of apparent behaviour (moral legitimation).  
Not surprisingly, Hrasky (2012) finds evidence of both types of legitimation tactics following content 
analysis of reports issued by the country’s largest listed companies, but the tendency of more carbon 
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intensive vs. less intensive organisations is perhaps counter-intuitive.  While companies in the materials 
and industrial sectors tend toward substantive action, companies such as those in the financial sector 
are “shifting away” from disclosure more consistent with moral legitimation.  Depressingly, Hrasky 
(2012) suggests that voluntary actions to reduce carbon impacts are generally not producing the desired 
outcome, at least in the short-term.  There is urgency for research on incentives that encourage actual 
mitigation of the effects of climate change and on accounting-related blockages that serve to impede 
progress.   
 
6. Conclusions 
As we noted above there is clearly an enormous challenge and opportunity to undertake urgent 
research into a wide range of accounting and auditing issues concerning climate change, GHG emissions 
accounting, reporting and assurance, and emissions management and reduction which the papers in this 
issue  serve to underline.  Nonetheless, while more research within organizations as well as reporting 
and assurance by organisations is undoubtedly required, we are keen to avoid it becoming the only or 
even dominant focus of climate changed based accounting research. In drawing some conclusions, 
therefore, we return to our own earlier broader analysis to raise some questions about the efficacy of 
Kyoto style emissions policies. The examples we provided above illustrate at various levels (e.g, 
individuals, products/services, organisations and nations) what has long been known by some: 
technological change and efficiency does not automatically deliver less impact (e.g., Ehrlich and Holdren, 
1971; Commoner, 1972; Holdren and Ehrlich, 1974; Gray, 2006; Gray et al. 2007; Milne, 2007; Prins et al. 
2009, Shrivastava, 2010). Consequently, policies solely focused on those ends may not deliver. Noting a 
ten-fold increase in his personal carbon footprint over 30 years, Paul Shrivastava wryly notes, “…the 
more I know about sustainability, the greater my eco-footprint grows” (Shrivastava, 2010, p. 443). Even 
knowledgeable individuals, then, do not escape the effects of wealth and affluence. In fact, because of 
‘rebound’ behavior and Jevon’s paradox – where for income and psychological reasons consumption 
exceeds efficiency gains, a focus on energy and emissions efficiency may conceal or even “lock-in” 
(Unruh, 2000; 2002) yet greater impacts. By re-casting Ehrlich and Holdren’s (1971) IPAT identity (i.e. 
Environmental Impact = Population x Affluence x Technology) as follows: 
Carbon Emissions  = C = P X GDP X TE X C  P GDP TE  
 
Where: P = population; GDP/P = affluence; TE/GDP = energy intensity; and C/TE = emissions intensity 
 
Prins et al. (2009) are also keen to ensure that if energy intensity and emissions intensity are the policy 
targets, they should be direct targets of investment and technology sharing and not indirect ones 
through financial incentives/penalties. They consider policy attempts that seek to deal directly with 
population control or curb wealth (GDP/P) as politically infeasible.  Yet, as Sachs (1999) and Jackson 
(2009) so eloquently articulate, we need to turn our attention to both sufficiency and efficiency. The 
technical, innovative and investment challenge is truly enormous, but so is addressing our values and 
extravagant Western lifestyles. For some, Kyoto style trading solutions are simply not up to the task 
(e.g., Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 2007, 2008; Prins and Rayner, 2007; Prins et al., 2009).  
 
In fact, by drawing on our previous national accounting analysis, one can speculate on just how tough a 
Kyoto type compliance scheme needs to get before we see significant efforts in terms of gross emissions 
reductions. We noted above that should New Zealand face the full liability of its gross emissions without 
available forestry offsets, it would face a liability of approximately NZ$1 billion. This was based on a 
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calculated 5-year overshoot of 54.1MtCO2e and a carbon price of NZ$20/tonne. So the full penalty 
incentive is about NZ$200m per annum.  With annual GDP at NZ$185 billion, this equates to a little over 
one tenth of one per percent of annual GDP. Yes, that’s right, one tenth of one percent - about NZ$1 a 
week per person. If carbon prices rose five fold to NZ$100/tonne we are still only talking a little over half 
a percent of annual GDP. Even trebling the overshoot to 30MtCO2e per annum (50% above 1990 levels) 
and paying NZ$100/tonne would cost less than 2% of GDP – about NZ$15/week per person.  
If this is the sort of penalty incentive necessary to bring about significant action, then we might argue, 
turning this around, that New Zealand requires a Kyoto target closer to 40MtCO2e p.a. (i.e. a 33% 
reduction below 1990 levels and a per capita gross emissions target of 10tCOe as opposed to current 
levels of 18tCO2e). Anything forestry did to further offset such levels would be a bonus. The critical issue 
in all of this, of course, is how on Earth would New Zealand manage to reduce annual gross emissions by 
30MtCOe without devastating its economic base? From where in agriculture, transport and stationary 
energy would we strip out 30MtCO2e p.a., and over how long a period does this need to happen?  Some 
believe it needs to happen within the next decade. Greenpeace New Zealand, for example, has been 
running a campaign that calls for a 40% cut from current emissions by 2020.20 This equates to a similar 
reduction of about 30MtCO2e. Eliminating all emissions associated with transport alone would get us 
only half way there! And this does not include the 8MtCO2e associated with international tourism Smith 
and Rodger (2007) calculated, since that currently resides outside of Kyoto commitments. 
Decommissioning all existing sources of thermal generation would also help, but with what would we 
replace them and how soon? And what of agriculture? Without eliminating a significant portion of 
livestock based agriculture it is difficult to see where significant emissions reductions would come. 
Forests might, and we stress might given the uncertainties involved, be New Zealand’s immediate saving 
grace, but long term and under tougher emissions regimes, that is not a feasible option. The challenge of 
actually reducing emissions is enormous, not just for New Zealand, for everyone. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1 Popular and useful overviews continue to emerge. See, for example, Giddens (2009), Hansen (2009), Morgan & 
McCrystal (2009), Hamilton (2010), and Stern (2010).  
2 One obvious exception to this is in Australia where the economic fallout from the global recession and bank 
failures has been minimal, and there has been over the past year or so a raging political debate about the 
Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, and the introduction of a carbon tax. In July 2011, the Gillard 
Government announced the introduction of a carbon tax of AU$23/tonne starting in July 2012 for the country’s 
biggest 500 polluters, covering about 60% of carbon emissions – agriculture and light transport are exempted.     
3 For easily accessible overviews of these issues, see, for example, Lynas (2004), Flannery (2005), Monbiot (2006), 
Pearce (2006), Hansen (2009), Morgan & McCrystal (2009), Hamilton (2010) and Stern (2010). 
4 Time Magazine, 6 October, 2008, Vol. 172, No.14. 
5 Time Magazine may in fact have understated US vehicle ownership by up to 100%. Dargay et al. (2007) and 
Dargay and Gately (1999) report much higher levels of ownership. For example, Dargay et al. (2007) report US 
levels of ownership for 1960 as 74.4 million (41% of population), and for 2002 as 233.9 million (81% of population). 
6 Of course, there are other variables omitted from this analysis such as vehicle travel rates – we suspect people 
drive more often and further due to habits, routines and improved infrastructure; effects of congestion – which 
increase emissions due to more vehicle idling but also put people off driving; rates of vehicle renewal by existing 
owners – potentially creating lags in efficiency gains; and the price and availability of fossil fuel supplies – of which 
price elasticity suggests consumers are quite insensitive to all but large price increases. Such variables suggest yet 
greater absolute emission levels than our analysis might suggest. We also acknowledge that vehicles are safer, 
faster, and more comfortable than they were 100 years ago, but this is precisely why fuel efficiency gains have not 
been greater – vehicles are heavier than they were even 10-20 years ago. 
7 The aviation industry also rather disingenuously likes to compare these fuel efficiency rates with modern motor 
vehicles, conveniently overlooking the fact that people fly distances in order of several magnitudes greater than 
they drive in the same time period. One or two long haul flights in a year often produce emissions far in excess of 
annual driving and living emissions for some.  
8 Within the financial commentary of its annual reports, at least until 2009, Air New Zealand provides a breakdown 
of changes in profitability. It discloses, for example, that “Fuel consumption rose just under 1% to 8.4 million 
barrels in 2007”. Using these physical quanta and observing that a barrel of liquid fuel is 42 US gallons (≈160 litres), 
that a litre of jet fuel emits 2.52kg of CO2e/litre (Mfe, 2008), and that as disclosed by Air New Zealand, 92% of its 
carbon emissions come from jet fuel, it is possible to estimate its annual total CO2e emissions. These estimates, 
however, ignore radiative forcings associated with combusting jet fuel at high altitudes. To account for these 
would significantly increase the estimates by 1.9 times (e.g., Sausen et al., 2005; Bows and Anderson, 2007). We 
consider these estimates accurate based on two disclosures by Air New Zealand. Our 2006 estimate of 
3.64MtCO2e is the same as disclosed in the 2007 annual report for 2006. Our estimate for 2009 of 3.55MtCO2e is 
based on 10% less fuel burn than in 2008, a fact Air New Zealand’s 2009 annual report (p. 6) confirms when it 
notes 10% savings of 350,000tCO2e. We stress the footprint analysis is an estimate, but note the underlying 
growth trend in capacity is squarely based on the organisation’s own fuel consumption disclosures. 
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9 The middle years 2000-2004 are omitted for presentation simplicity. 
10A point worth noting here is that international aviation emissions are currently excluded from the Kyoto Protocol 
and often, therefore, excluded from domestic emissions trading programmes or taxes. Air New Zealand currently 
only faces the costs of its domestic emissions under New Zealand’s Emissions Trading Scheme for Liquid Fuels. 
Estimates of its international aviation emissions suggest these constitute greater than 50% of its total emissions at 
>2.2MtCO2e. The European Union is currently seeking to include all international aviation to and from the EU into 
its Emissions Trading Scheme, but this is being actively resisted by some countries and particularly the US.   
11 And this seems to square with anecdotal observations about ticket prices. For example, a return trip Auckland-
London emits approx 4.8tCO2e/passenger (Ministry for the Environment NZ guidance states the carbon emission 
factor for international travel as 0.132 kg/km, so a return trip is the equivalent of 4839 kg CO2). This implies an 
additional cost (@NZ$100/tonne) of NZ$480/passenger, which constitutes a 12-16% increase on a typical ticket 
price of NZ$3000 to NZ$4000. 
12 This section draws from and extends Milne et al. (2010). 
13 Federated Farmers, media release 4 May 2009, “ETS not needed to meet Kyoto Obligations”, available at: 
http://www.fedfarm.org.nz/n1449,56.html 
14 22 April 2009, Hansard Vol. 653, p. 2615. Being in Government, however, does seem to have curtailed Smith’s 
position. In opposition, he was more forthright about the estimates. “This latest figure of $1.009 billion shows how 
incompetent Labour has been on climate change. This blow-out in New Zealand's Kyoto liability is a consequence 
of the record levels of deforestation that have occurred since 2004 and the failure of Labour's costly and 
ineffective policies on greenhouse gas emissions” (5 May 2008, Finance, infonews.co.nz). 
15Unlike financial accounting, with its transactions basis, GHG inventory teams are far more willing to accept all 
they can do is estimate GHG emissions. Even for periods that have elapsed, they know they are providing educated 
guesses of carbon emissions based on a series of models and assumptions. And when these change, they re-
estimate emissions levels, even for prior periods.  
16 In addition to projecting the net quantum of GHG for 2008 to 2012, the Ministry for the Environment is also 
responsible for reporting New Zealand’s annual GHG Emissions Inventory. The “net position” reports for the five-
year CP1 dovetail with the annual GHG inventory reports which seek to estimate and report the annual national 
GHG emissions. GHG Inventory reports operate two years in arrears. So, for example, the 2011 GHG Inventory 
Report estimates the annual emissions for 2009, the 2010 GHG Inventory Report estimates the annual GHG 
emissions for 2008 and so on. Come 2014, all five GHG Inventory reports (2010 to 2014) will cover the first 
commitment period 2008-2012. 
17 These 1990 levels were calculated in the GHG Inventories 2007 and earlier. A complicating factor is that 
subsequent GHG Inventories may periodically re-estimate prior years’ levels, and especially the benchmark year of 
1990. In 2008, for example, the 1990 level was re-estimated at 60.8 MtCO2e, and in 2009 it was re-estimated at 
59.1 MtCO2e. Most of the revisions are associated with revised methodologies for calculating agricultural 
emissions, and in some instances waste. In 2008, for example, 1990 level agricultural emissions were revised down 
to 31.9 MtCO2e, and in 2009, they were again revised down to 30.3 MtCO2e. In 2009, 1990 waste emissions were 
revised down to 2.1 MtCO2e. 
18 Based on the 2009 re-estimated 1990 emissions level of 59.1 MtCO2e. 
19 Readers might tend to believe that New Zealand primarily generates electricity from hydro-electric sources. And 
at one time electricity generation was virtually entirely generated by hydro.  55% of electricity now comes from 
hydro, with a further 12% coming from other renewable like wind, biomas, geothermal. However, the increasing 
trend over the past few decades has been greater reliance on thermal (coal and natural gas) generation which now 
accounts for 33% of electricity generation.  
20 See http://www.greenpeace.org/new-zealand/en/take-action/Take-action-online/Sign-On/ 
